University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Open Access Master's Theses
1982

The Role of the Boston Redevelopment Authority in the Planning
and Implementation of Copley Place, Boston, Massachusetts
Margaret M. Horak
University of Rhode Island

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses

Recommended Citation
Horak, Margaret M., "The Role of the Boston Redevelopment Authority in the Planning and Implementation
of Copley Place, Boston, Massachusetts" (1982). Open Access Master's Theses. Paper 644.
https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/theses/644

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Open Access Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

THE ROLE OF THE BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
IN THE PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF COPLEY PLACE, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN'
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF
COMMUNITY PLANNING
\

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND
1982

MASTER OF COMMUNITY PLANNING
RESEARCH PROJECT
OF
MARGARET M. HORAK

Approved:
Major Professor
Pennis C. Muniak
Director
Thomas D. Galloway

Table of Ce>ntents

I.

Introd11 ction

II.

The Development Framowork

III. History of the Site
IV.

The Planning Process

v.

Analysis and Conclusion

~I.!filE~

A. MemorandUJ!l of Understanding, between State and UIOO

B. Citizen Review Committee: List of Meetings

c.

~RA

Response to Administrative Complaint, Executive

SUmma.ry

D. Copley Place: Fact Sheet, UIDC
E. Copley Place: Pr ess Release, UIDC

Maps and Design!!!.
Copley Place: Site Location
Copley Place: Site Constraints
Copley Place: Ground Level Building Plans
Copley Place: Site Location, Model, Program Components

Bibliogr~phy

... ·· ~ .~
1

I. Introduction

Cople~

Place, a $350 million mixed use development in downtown

Boston, is unique in its size and diversity. The development entails
two major hotels, a convention facility, an up-scale department store,
260,000 square feet retail space, cinemas, 800,000 square feet office

space, and 100 units of mixed-income housing. The history of the development -- the transjtion from concept to reality -

is quite complex.

The developer, the Urban Investment Development Company (Ur:oc ),
first expresf!ed interest in the site in early 1977. The groundbreaking
ceremony took yla.ce in November, 1980. The three-and a half years in
between were filled with negotiation, trade-offs, and co-optation.
The early part of the process comprised leasing agreements from the
State of Massachusetts for the site, a 9.5 acre land-air pa.reel above
the Mass Turnpike in Back Bay. A Citizen Review Committee participated
from the beginning. The latter part of the process involved the City of
Boston in the application for a federal Urban Development Action Grant

(UDAG).
The development process of Copley Place signals a unique !mplemen ta tion of public and private interests. The circumstances leading up

to the groundbreaking and beyond create an intriguing account of bargaining and special

intere~t pres~ires.

T:~e

magnitude of the project

will result in, and has already witnessed, strong implications for the
adjacent neighborhoods

a..~d

the City of Boston.

I
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II. The Development Framework

Local government is playing an increasingly important role in
urban

investment~

Having recognized that the economic growth rate lies

in t he birthrate of new business ( cornia, 1978 p.-- ), public officials
have begun t o devise ways of attracting investment and shaping it to
ma.x1Jnum -publi c benefit.
Public officials have demonstrated an ability to exert themselves
successfully to affect their fiscal well-being. With the goal of bringing
positive impacts on

emplo~

local tax base and business activity,

the public sector is using both philosophical and active tools to work
with potential developers. Philosophically, the

importa.~ce

of offering

a receptive polit ical climate cannot be understated. As a developer
weighs the investment optfons, a public official can offer a hospitable
and attractive communlty environment that may help to persuade the decision (Co:rnia, 1978, p. - - ). The developer must work with the public
officials

~an

amicable rela t ionship from the beginning can help to

foster a working alliance advantageous to both sides.
The public sector may also employ active intervention techniques
in the development process. The city has the traditional tools of

zoni~~

and service delivery at their disposal, as well as more innovative development controllil (HUD, 1980, p.16). The use of density bonuses can work
to concentrate development in designated areas; the offering of air
rights and site parceling can bring development, as with Copley Place.
But the Key to the success of these tools is that they mesh with market

{
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trends. substantial development interest, regardless of public intervention, is Ja sed upon profit motivation.
Because the 'Ptlblic and private sectors are so differ ent in
thei r orientation, it is crucial that they understand one another.
The public sector must strive to determine market forces, to identify
the community's assets in terms of development criteria, and to learn
effectiv( packaging ·.echniques •. With a thorough understanding of what
the private

inv~stor

is looking for, the public official can package an

idea for dev&lopment consideration.
In addition to a market understanding, the public sector must

have a financial understanding of the development process. An official
at the Boston Redevelopment Authority has stated that the financial

re~

quirements of a developer are legitimate (Hollister, 1980, p.28). A
lengthy planning process and uncoordinated public sector intervention
cost a developer a large sum of money, enough in fact, to result in the
inability to actually constz:uct a project • . If a developer strings out
his assets during the planning stage, then he can risk the construction
capital needed to begin. The city can help immeasura.bly by being prepared
for potential development projects. The economic growth or revitalization
of a community is promoted by cutting down on bureaucratic red tape which
slows the process (Cornia, 1978, p.-- ). The city can strive for interagency coordination to alleviate misunderstanding and inefficiency.
Also, community involvement is crucial during the planning process to
avoid problems during·an impact assessment which costs a developer.
Economic development requires a partnership which is tha critical
ingredient in areas of financial feasibility, timing and location (HUE,
1980, p.21). The joint· venture between the pg~lic and private sector

I
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actors is often the answer to insuring smooth development projects. The
partn~rship, from the beginning, helps to ensure a development that

occurs more expeditiously, with success for both parties.
The cooperative public/private investment trend is a relatively
new phenomenon. The gradual realization that businesses were choosing
to locate in suburban and exurban areas resulted in an attempt for a
more active local participation in development decisions. The public
sector, in assuming the role of partner, is bringing a new level of
expertise into the .more traditional "reactive" position played by a
local official in the past. The evidence of involvement is f0wtd in the
formalization of public/private development ventures and the skill and
sophistication of public personnel in the planning and implementation
of projects in their community (NcO ED, 1978, p.1).
The role of the local official and the developer varies according
to a number of factors (U.S. Conf. of Mayors, N.D. p.1). The economic

situation may call for a financial partnership in which the public
sector leverages

~rivate

investment with public dollars, as with the

Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program. Initiated in 1977 under
the Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the program requires
a leveraging ratio of at least three to one private/public dollars. The
offer of public money is used to persuade investment in declining urban
areas to promote jobs and revitalization.
Another factor which shapes the role played by each partner is the
political setting (US Conf. of Mayors, N.D. p.1). The public sector
should assure a favorable governmental and community attitude. From

I
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the developer's perspective, there is a great need for consistency of
treatment by government along with a flexibility of public assistance.
(Borut, 1979,

p.4).

In

cases where political in-fighting overcome con-

sistency and reception, a developer may assume a more offensive role,
thereby destroying a working partnership.
Motivation and capacity also help to set the role of the partners

(us Conf. of Mayors, N.D. p.1). Obviously, the extent to which each
partner is committed to the project determines the degree of voluntary
participation. Cooperative efforts are most successful with an underlying concensus between the public and private sectors that their
partnership is a necessary condition for urban reinvestment (US Conf. of
Mayors, N.D., p.1) •
. However, some feeling exists among urban activists that private
investment is not always the best a.newer. According to Frank Smizik of
the Mass Law Refo:ti:i Institute (the organization representing 8 South End,
Boston residents who are suing HUD and the City of Boston because of the

.

displacement that will result from Copley Place -- HUD has granted an
$18.8 million UDAG for the project), private investment, leveraged with
public money, is considered

~

solution to blighted areas. He feels

that too often, these projects go ahead without the consideration of
all of the impacts. He has ''no quarrel with private investment, but
there must be a plan to handle its impacts on minorities -

particularly

in a city like Boston where they have no place to go if they're dis-

placed." Therefore, local officials involved in economic development
planning must balance the desires of profit-motivated developers against

6

the public interest goals of the community (HUD, 1980, p.10). Theimmediate outputs of a
creation -

develop~ent

project -- expanded tax base and job

must be weighed in terms of the real outcomes-displacement.

The concept of leveraging private investment and providing supportive market conditions is at the heart of urban economic developm-ent
planning (NCUED, 1978, p.1). To maintain a viable economy, the public
sector must join hands wi th potential developers and take a stand in what
happens to a community. 'lbe basic components in support of developmeni
are a favorable attitude, flexible tools and knowledgeable

person.~el

(Botu.: t, 1979, p.4). When utilized properly and to the best advantage,
the public sector can effectively guide private investment by employing
the available tools of land use and zoning, infrastructure and property

tax abatement. Preparedness works to avoid the destructive polarization
between public and private actors (Hollister, 1980, p.22).

\
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III. Riston:_

The Copley Place Site had been a vacant parcel for over 20 years.
In

t..~e

late 1950's, the area was cleared for the Mass. Turnpike Extension

into Boston. Before that time, the South End was joinad physically and
architecturally with Back Bay. Huntington Ave. had been lined with fine,
old buildings that integrated with the historically significant structures
nearby

~

the Boston Public Library, the Copley Plaza Hotel, and Trinity

Church. Nearby, the Prudential Center was built on a site of old railroad yards, further 'cleaning up' the area. Since the building of the
turnpike, the City has attempted to identify an appropriate development
for the site.
In the 1965 Boston General Plan the city planners called for a
large-sca,le develo'Pment on the site to work in conjunction with a. new
:Back Bay Transportation Center. However, neither plan was

implemented.

The priorities for development were placed elsewhere in Back Bay with
the Prudential Center expansion in the 1960 1 s and the John Hancock
Tower in the 1970's. Even though several architectural firms attempted
to devise a development scheme that would overcome the severe physical
constraints of the site, none could achieve an economically viable
solution.
The structural difficulties of the site are due to its location
both next to and over the Massachusetts Turnpike. A development would
have to be built on air rights. 'Ihe site's physical constraints involve
access problems with the Turnpike exit ramps, and the Amtrak rail tracks
and platform.

/
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Until re cently, the City was unable to attract serious development proposals. The Clty•s Comprehensive Economic Development Strategy
prepared with U.S. EDA funding, called for a targeted development in
the area that would overcome these constraints -- one that would stimulate investment and the creation of jobs.

The Strategy is part of a

program instituted to counteract the effects of job losses and the
shift to greater specialization in services, which result in high

un~

employment among minorities and low-income persons.
Several factors contributed to the recognition of the Copley site's
potential for a large-scale project. The tremendous demand for available
office space in Boston encouraged an attempt to devise a feasible plan.
Boston's

rental office market is one of the strongest in the c01ntry

with an occupancy rate hovering near
To~er

99%.

The rent-up of the Hancock

put an end to the availability of office space inthe Copley Square

area. With the Boylston Street retail area facelift, referred to by some
as the "uptown Paneuil Hall," a strong demand

for"ad~itional

retail

space arose.
Physical improvements to the surrounding have made the site more
attractive. The renovation of the Copley Plaza Hotel and the completion
of the Boston Public Library addition provided significant contributions
to :Back Bay appearance. Also, the Sheraton Hotel expanded sliccessf"ully
and the Saks Fifth Avenue store was added to the Prudential Center.
Finally, firm plans for the reconsturction of the Back Bay Amtrak
Ra.ilraod Station wa:re made. These plan3 include .realignment of the

r
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Southwest Corr.idol'* and the addi t±on of a new rapid trcsnsi t route
(the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA) orange line) with a
major stop at the Back Bay station. As

a..~

indicator of commitment, in

March 1982, the :M.BTA announced the tra\ferral of $2.5 million from the
rider shelter program to the funding for the reconstruction of the
Station.
The combination, therefore, of both physical improvements to

th~

area, and strong State and City commitment to a Copley Place proposal,
prompted renewed developer interest in the site. The development now
under construction was proposed by the Urban Investment Development
Company (UIDC), a division of Aetna Life Insurance Corp, in early 1977.
The development opportunity followed years of political negotiation
with the Park Pl aza project**, _another development scheme for downtown
.Boston, City officials were sensitive to repeating a similar hassle.
With the Park Plaza li'lcident, the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)
published development guidelines and solicited bids in a competition.
A developer for Park Plaza was designated and his detailed plans were
then

subjecte~

to a 1971 state Environmental Impact Review (EIR). The

plan drew "DUblic criticism and delayed approval of the project for three
years. By this time, a supplemental EIR was required to update the
assessment. The original developer withdrew because of the lengthy
pla.nnlng process, and ten years were lost. When approached with the

*The Southwest Corridor was a highway planned to link downtown Boston
with the suburbs to the southwest. Under the highway moratorium imposed
by Gcv. Francis Sargent, the land was turned over to the MBTA for use
as a rapid transit southwest line.
**Park Plaza, located about ! mile from the Copley Site, had been a
develcI>inent se.heme proposing a hotel, retail, and office spaae.
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Copley proposal, the City and State were detennined not

~1

commit the

same error.

rl. The Planninl! Process

The developer, UIDC, was required to engage in a two phase negotiation process: first, with the State, and second, with the City. '!he
site was owned by the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, so UIDC needed
first to negotiate for use of the property. '!hen, the City became involved as the central public participant in the process with permit
approvals and the Urban Development Action Grant application.

The selection of UIDC as the developer for the Copley site marks
a unique process of a front-end approach to impact assessment (Hollister,
1980, p.22)-. UIDC demonstrated interest in developing the Copley Place
site in early 1977, and the State decided to grant an option
perty for a 6-month period while proceeding

wit.~

oti

the pTo-

the citizen review and

impact assessment. State Planning Director Frank Keefe advocated the
early desienation of a developer to speed the planning process. UIDC was
seen as a strong developer with a good track record. UIIX: is a w'nollyowned subsidiary of Aetna Life and Casualty, "the nation's largest
diversifi~d

financial organization," according to a company brochure.

The most recent development completed by UIIX: was Chicago's Water Tower
Place, a 3.1 million square ft., 74-story mixed-use ~omplex (UIDC, 1982).
The Governor Michael Dukakis

agreed to Keefe's plan, and on April

18, 1977, the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority (MTA)

signed a Memorandum
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of Understanding with UIDC "during which UIDC will engage in engineering
and market analyses and the Turnpike Authority will refuse to negotiate
or lease its Copley Square land and air rights to any other party • • •
at the end of six months, everyone will have a full understanding of the
constraints and opportunities at Copley Square, and a decision can be
made by both the developer and the

sta~a

and the city public sector

agencies as to whether it makes sense to proceed into an option" (Keefe,
9/22/77).
UIDC approached the state with the support of the Western International Hotels who were committed to building an 800-room luxury hotel
as part of the Copley Place program. Western had approached the State
earlier, alone, with a plan to build a hotel on the land section of the
parcel, but could not convinae the MTA to agree (Hollister, 1980, p.30).
The inclusion of a hotel met with favor from the public officials. A BRA
study, completed in 1976, concluded that, "In order to optimize its
competitive

po~ition, ~ost on

needs convention-oriendted hotel rooms

providing 1600-1800 rooms and located in proximity to its convention
facilities" (BRA, 1976, p.4): namely, the John B. Hynes Auditorium,
located 3 blocks form Copley Place. The demand for hotel space was keen,
and a developer with a major hotel chain in hand was welcome ••
With the Memorandum of Understanding, UIDC began planning the
d~velopment •

.At that time, basic issues of site usage, massing, and the

interrelationships of the program elements were considered. The initial
intention was to design the tall buildings away from Copley Square to
reduce the perceived scale
progressed,

ur:oo

(UI~,

1980, p.5). As the schematic plans

attempted to locate the tall buildings away from
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the 'furnpike ramps to avoid constru ction of major structures over the
greatest s ite obstructions.
The state brouf,tlt in the City as a participant in the oversight
of the planning, th& Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) acting as the
City's representative. 'lbe Office of state Planning organized -the Citizen
Review Committe (c.ttc ) under the direction of Dr. Tunney

r~ee

of MIT.

In May 1977, the CRC group members were selected and assembled. The CRC
was made up of neighborhood organizations from the South End, Back Bay,
and the Fenway sections of Bos ton. The organizations were representative
of virtually all the impacted persons, both middle-class prof essionals
and low-income minorities. fu e Back Bay F'eder ation represented area
busines $e s end ins tit .itions . In all, the CEC membership a."'ld its variety
highlight the complex issiies involved wit3 Copl ey Place (Hollister, 1960,
p. 34).

Participation by the public in reviewing a project the size of
Copley Place is unprecedented in Boston. According to Teri Weidner,
Director of Commun ications at UI:OC, the CRC process was more extensive
than any other with which UIDC had been involved. Y.s. Weidner states
that the entire citizen participation process amounted to an expense of

$6 million to the developer (.Weidner interview). In the beginning, UIDC
was not certain as to how extensive the CP.C involvement would be, but
it soon became clear that the State and City were, at this point, behind
t~e ~ro c ess

and would back the citizens

( Holli~ter,

1980, p.38).

The CRC pro cess began in earnest. The d€ailine for their final
recommendations f or the project was September, 1977, which allowed only
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3-4 months r eYiew. A total of 19 meetings were held throughout that
first period. 'rhe sessions were devoted to issues of community economi c
development, neighborhood stability, impact on business, physical design, and traffic impact
the CRC (UIDC, 1980,

~

addressed by individual task forces within

p.5).

Lee di'rected the early meetings to provide a basic level of understanding. These early workshops offered information regarding the physical and social environment, legal requirements, and the developer's
perspective (Hollister, 1980, p.35). Various technical experts were on
hand to answer questions, such as the state's Central Transportation
Planning Staff. Lee himself dealt with questions concerning physical
planning. A UIDC offi cial, Dln Gifford, lectured on real estate development , and a State

~lannin g

r epr esentative handled regulatory control

ouestions ( ~ollister, 1980, p.35).

(note: There was very little news-

paper co·terage of Copley at this point. The BRA file begins with their
involvement in the process).
Throughout the summer the CRC met, and at the end of June, an
interim report specif led certain issues of concern. These issues included
physical design, land use, jobs, pedestrian access, traffic, housing,
'\

wind and shadows, and economic impact (UIDJ, 1980, p.5). FUrther development in workshops resulted in CRC Final Reconnnendations, delivered
Septe!Ilber 22,

1977. The recommendations took form as goal statements

followed by general guidelines for action a.n:l specific. steps to take to
achieve the desired end. The goalB w6re as follows: (1) Community Economic
Development; (2) :::\etail Impact; (3) South End Stabilization; (4) Staging;

(5) '1nssine ; (6) Land Use; (7) Pe destrians; (8) Traffic; and, (9) Envir-
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onmental

Impact (CRC, 1977). '!be issues brought up at this early point

in the planning process remained in the negotiations until the end.
Meanwhile, as the Memorandum of Understanding had called for,
UIDC undertook its own feasibility studies (UIDC, 1980, p.5). The.
. UIDC planners were conceptualizing the size and scale of the various
project components , the hotel, retail, and office spaces. It became
clear that the bridging of the Turnpike, ramps, and rail tracks would
be enormously expensive. According to UIDC, it was at this early point
in the planning that some sort of piblic subsidy was seen to be necessary,
as well as an expanded pla.n to help absorb these costs.
UIDC considered over a half-dozen design concepts during 1977
(UIDC, 1980, p.16-34). F.a.ch was modified to include the imformation from
the cnnsulting studies. Finally, 3 alternatives were presented to the public which provided a "workable concept plan" (UIDC, 1980, p.6). A scale
model was developed to illustrate the conclusions of the analysis. The
CRC recommendations were incorporated into the 3.alternatives. The
recommendations called for 3 major modifications: (1) Housing -- UIDC
agreed to the inclusion of 100 units of mixed-income housing after the
State and City officials insisted upon following the CRC idea; (2) Parcel
ncn --

UIDC agreed to develop this paroel (i.t is the designated area for

the Neiman-Marcus department store in the project) on Dartmouth Street,
which they had proposed to leave vacant; (3) Access -- UIDC agreed to
provide

b~tter

vehicular and ·pedestrian access into and around the

project (UIDC, 1980, p.7).
The design modification process continued, and in June, 1978, UIDC
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.

presented a revised preliminary design which they felt was both fina.ncially feasible and in conformance with CRC guidelines. The June 1978
desien consisted of 1 hotel, 2 department stores, a shopping mall, an
office building, a par king

ga.ra~,

and the housing. At this point, the

design process was frozen so that :the appropriate drawing could be articulated. This design also became the basis for the environmental lmpact
studies, which were initiated during the summer of 1978 (UIJ)C, 1980, p.8).
At this time, Keefe announced that the site and air rights would
not be sold to the developer, fee simple, but rather the MTA would lease
the property to UIDC. The negotiations for a lease rent schedule began
since the ba.sic issues of construction were resolved. (Hollister, 1980,

The CRC, which had been dormant since the September, 1977 Final
RecooJnendations, was reactivated to review the latest design proposal.
~"'hroughout

the summer, the CRC met at 7 workshops to discuss impacts

-

that were not addressed in detail during the previous sw:amer. This
second phas9 of the CRC was organized by Prof. Lee. In Lee's words,
this phaae of the CRC process was, "'to keep the scheme within acceptable
limits. 11he analysis of impacts that occurred during the second half of
1978 did notdirectly change the development scheme, but it made the
lease agreement possible and acceptable" (Hollister, 1980, p.41). The
impact iasues discussed were effects on Back Bay businesses, population
compositlon of surrounding neighboJ;hoods, air quality, and other environmantal impacts (UIDC, 1980, p.195).
In Ootober, 1978, the Draft Environmental Impact Review (EIR) was
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rele..ased by

t.~e

consulting firm hired by

U~,

Environmental Research

and Technology, Inc. However, earlier that Fall,

U~

announced a design

change that included at third department store. The consultants did not
have sufficient time to fully assess the impact of the preferred design,
so they extrapolated the original design impacts to expand the analysis.
The CRC and the public officials accepted the EIR, but insisted upon a
more complete analysis at a later date. However, before the end of the
year,

U~

again revised the design, to

~educe

the retail and increase

the hotel and office components (UIDC, 1980, p.8). It was felt that the
Boston market could not sustain 3 department stores (earlier interest
expressed by potential department store tenants had softened), while
demand mushroomed for the other types of deveopment. During the spring
of 1979, the design work concentrated on a two-hotel,

1-depa.-rtme1i~

sto't"'e

program.
Meanwhile, political events at the state level temporarily confused
the negotiations. Governor Dukakis and his advigors had been working both
with the developer and the City since the inception of the project. Keefe,
the director of State Planning and Fred Salvucci, Transportation Secretary, had been instrumental in representing the State's interests. Interestingly, Salvucci h.a:.d formerly been an aide to Mayor Kevin White, and
worked as a key liason with City Hall (Hollister, 1980,

p.54). However,

Dukak:is was upset by Edward King in the Democratic Gubernatorial Primary

iri September,

and

King werit on to win the election. The lease signing

date had been targeted for DeGember 15, but the prospect of a new administration was potentially uns.ettling.
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UIDC chose to continue working with the Dukakis administration,
and marathon negotiation sessions were held in December. UIDC felt
that working with a new set of state officials would delay the project
at least one construction season (Lee, p.43).
The points that held up the lease signing were affirmative action
and t he ren t schedule. The State, as would the City, wanted assurances
that at leas·t 25% of the construction jobs would go to minority residents.
The rent schedule was complicated, and there wene misu"nderstandinga
between the State and UIDC. 'lbe State comprimised with the affirmative
action portion of the lease, decreasing from a required

25~

to 2CY'/o of

the jobs to be minority. Howeve.r, the State refused to negotiate the rent
subordination schedule (Hollister, 1980, p.43). The State, in fact,
t hreatened to decline a lease agreement with UIDC , and advertise for a
new develope r. Given the impending termina ti on of the Dukakis administration, the threat implied a.n ul.timatum of "deal with us, and know what you
have; or wait for the new administration, and see what you might get."
(note: The only State actor who would continue into the King adminis t ration , John Driscoll, Chairman of the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority,
did not play a major leadership role in any negotiations, according to
Frank Keefe).
In the end, the bargaining s~ssions were successful. The State and

UIDC officially solidified their relationship at a lease signing ceremony
on December 22~ · 1978~ The
last

cha~ter

media proclaimed the event as the fitting

in the Dukakis administration -- one that had such a strong

policy for urban developement. Yet, "the largest connnercial development ·
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in state hi s tory"

(Globe, 12/23/78 ), was not completed. In reality, it

was just beginning. The state actors were finished with their major involvement, and the City s tood ready to continue the negotiation process
and to issue the necessary permits.
Returning to t he de s ign process, the developer had revised the original 2-store/a-hotel scheme to a 3-store/1-hotel scheme, and finally,
to a 1-store/2-hotel scheme. As these details were worked out by the
architect, the CRC reconvened and began assessing the impacts in light
of these changes (UIDC, 1980, p.9). Between February and November, 1979,
CRC held 14 meetings to assess the impacts and re-examine the issues not
adequately addressed intbe 1978 sessions.
As a result of the CRC sessions, 2 new studies were commissioned
by the BRA. The CRC determined that the housing and retail impacts
needed to be studies further. A local consultant, Ma.rk Wal tch, was hired
to advise the CRC on the analysis of the impacts (Hollister, 1980,p.41).
Waltch helped the CRC to understand and critically review the analyses
resulting from the BRA commiss ions(UIDC, 1980, p. 9).
The newly completed studies were released at the end of 1979. The
CRC taskforces on the housing and retail issues also released their own
Swmnary

Analyses. The CRC conclusions that were drawn resembled those of

the BRA-commissioned studiesa the retail impact would be beneficial to
existing area businesses by dra wing larger numbers of shoppers into the
vicinity {CRC, 1979); the housing in!pact would result in some displacement (recognized as an ongoing national trend, however), but the addition
of 100 units within Copley Place and the further impetus to develop the
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Tent City site, would work to counteract

gentrificat ~on

(CRC, 1979).

(note: Tent City is a 3.3 acre site adjacent to the Copley Place project
which has been re s identially vacant for over 15 years. The site earned
its name in 1968 from squatters who lived thrare, in tents, to protest
the City's lack of commitment to rebUilding low-income housing. The City
argue s that the site is

non~assemblable.

Two-thirds of the p11?oe .is owned

privately, and is unavailable)
In

addition to revi ewing the updated retail and housing impact

studies,ttie last CRC meetings held in 1979 included discussions about
the city application for an Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG). The
UDAG was required since the State did not agree to "subsidize" Copley

Place with either a 121A tax abatement (a state approved proper ty tax
abatement in liat of a set yearly fee, a concept designed originally for
the Prudential Center), or a land cost relief. The developer had first
expressed the need fo:r some form of public funding in the summer of 1978.
'lbe necessity of applying public funds to co7er the exorbitant site pre-

pa,ration costs had been acknolrledged from the initial negotiations with
the the State (UIDC, 1980, p.8).
The l3RA agreed to apply for a UDAG and began the information pre'\

paration process. Public input was sought by the city with regard to not
only the UDAG application, but also

th~

oth9r l'llblio approvals in the

process. The BRA worked with1he CBC to outline a meeting format for the
fjrst _pµblic U:PA_G hearing to be _held _on)fovember 19,

1979~

(Tw~

public

hearings are required in the UDAG application process, one for preapplj oation input and the second for final application approval).
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Before the meeting, background information waa mailed to all CRC membe:r·s
and other interested organizations. At this point, it was hoped by CRC
that the Tent City funding request o! $5 million could be tied into the
Copley Place UDAG application. State Representative Mel King, from the
Scuth End, saw the Copley Place UDAG as a chance to leTerage subsidized
housing on the Tent City site (Boston Ledger,

4/18/80).'

As a type of

trade-off, the accelerated population change that would result from
Copley Place would be nega. ted by giving the low-income persons a secure
future in the area.
'lbe meeting was held at 7:00 P.M. at the Boston Public Library.
The meeting was chaired by William Holland, Director or the Mayor's Office
of Public Service, and seated on the panel were Kenneth Himmel, VicePresident of UIDC; Steven Eimer, Project Manager of Copley Place at UIDC;
Richard Garver, Deputy Director of the BRA; Jeffrey Chmura, Project
Coordinator of Copley Place at BRA; and George Bennett, Director of the
Employment and Economic Policy Administration. The format of the meeting
was set · and formalized in an opening statement by Holland, which was
followed by introductory remarks given by Eimer, Garver, and Bennett.
Testimony from the public was then requested. Thirty two persons spoke.
The majority of the testimony was addressed to a linkage with Tent
City. The feeling among many of the speakers was if there would be one
UDAG, there should be two. It was seen as a way to combine city and
federal goals or leveraging private investment with the community goals
of low-income housing. (note: A UDAG may be used for low-income housing)
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Those who spoke against Tent City ai·gued that it misnt serve to jeopardize the success of Copley Place. Although Tent City was not directly
the subject of the hearing, the mood of the meeting was set by the
~motional

issue (UDAG Testimony, 1979).

Others who testified spoke to the question of the extent of social
impacts of Copley Place. The residents of the South End, testifying on
behalf of their

neighborhood,e~horted

the city to consider and mitigate

the harmful effects of Copley Place. Ralph Jordan, a resident and fonner
Chairperson of the CRC Task Force on Community Economic Development, noted
that, "when public funds are used on a large scale to assist a private
developer, those funds must be used to the greatest extent possible to
provide jobs and other economic opportunities to economically disadvantaged citizens, particularly those whose own lives and lives of family
and friends are so greatly affected by this development. The City must
provide leadership to prove to all those living in the City that it
cares, and that the Mayor will

m~e

sure the peaple of Boston get their

fair share" (UDAG Testimony, 11/19j79, p.72).
The Cit,y had made it clear earlier that the UDAG would not be
100i~

erant money. The developer initially a·s ked for an outright grant,

but the City took the position of requiring a return of a portion of the
money, according to a BRA spokesperson (Dick Garver, 11/19/79). The
developer needed the entire sum immediately, but later, after the construction would be completed and prC'fits from the operation would begin,
the developer could afford to repay the loan with interest. The terms of
the repayment amount and schedule were not known at the time of the
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November meeting, but were in the proaess of negotiation. It had been
anticipated that the terms

~ould

be worked out and a UDAG written by the

January 31, 1980 deadline for applications. However, the repayment schedule and the jobs issue became the fo cal points for BRA - UIDC negotiations during t he ensuing months.
While the UDAG negotiations and design development continued, the
State amended its lease agreement with the developer. Since the Copley
Place program had changed in composition during the summer of 1979
(:the reductiDn of retail and department store space and the increase of
hotel and office space), the MTA revised its rent payment schedule. The
Air R).ghts Lease of December, 1978 was amended with the new f.inancial
terms on January 31, 1979 (UIDC, 1980, p.10). The new lease was signed
by UIDC Chairman Thomas Klutznick, the new C-overnor, Edward King, and
MTA Chairman John Driscoll. The affirmative action requirements were

unchanged, and the CRC process was extended to ihe end of May, 1980

(unx:, 1980, p.11).
The foeus of the winter of 1979 and the early spring of 1980 was
the UDAG application. The BEA and the developer put concerted effort
into working out the detadls. Described as an"iterative process" by
Lucas DiLeo, Project Coordinator of Copley Place for the BRA, the negotiations were a continual interacition between the :BRA and UIDC. The
legal, financial, design, neighborhood impact, employment, and environmental issues were all' intertwihed in the UDAG discussion. By April, the
negotiation centered around two major areas of the application: (1) the
financial terms of the UDAG - the total amount, the ratio of loan to grant,
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the method of repayment of the loan portion, and the basic terms of the
business agreement; and, (2) the affirmative a c tion guidelines to be
followed both for jobs and minori t y contr acts during construction and for
the ~ermanent emploTilent opportunities (UIDC, 1980, p.11).
The financial tenns were

wo ~k e d

out early in the month (Globe,

4/10/80). The amount of the UDAG was set at $18.8 million, $3.8 million
of which would be

~

grant to the project, and $15 million of which would

constitute the loan. The repayment of the loan, which won't begin until
1984

or

85, will amount to $42 million over the 21-year life of the

loan. The monies collected will be put int o a Neighborhood Development
Fund to be supervised by the City Council. The interest rate for repayment
was set at 1CY/6, when the current mortgage rate was 13% at a commercial

bank.
The payback represents an innovative measure in the unAG for Copley
Place. The Mayor had issued an Executive Order in 1979 regarding the
creation of a neighborhood

develop~an t

fund as a symbol of the city's

desire to make sure that the economic benefits resulting from private
investment in the City are not allowed to escape from it. The BRA, from
the beginning, committed itself to using the recycled federal monies in
the impact areas of Copley Place. At a time when the effects of Copley

Place would begin to be felt, the money from the payback could be used
to help mitigate displacement and assist low-income housing (UDAG Testimony, 11/19/79, p.18). Also, the BRA mentioned use of the payback to help
coI:llllUility businesses start up operation in the neighborhood retail section
of the r,opley Place development.
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The CRC held a meeting on Apr il 14, 1980 to review the UDAG application.
In preparation for the second of the two required UDAG public hearings,
to be held t he following day, the CRC members considered all the sections
of the application except those referring to the jobs agreement, which
was yet unresolved. The April 15 meeting was a City Council Committee
hearing. The Council Committee on Planning and Develoiinant reviews all
draft UDAG applications, taking testimony from the public, the applicant
BRA, and the developer.
Thirty per sons testified at the meeting, including r esidents of
the South End, bus iness leaders, and construction workers, who were concer ned a.bout th e jobs issue.

As with t he November public hearing, the

Tent City is sue was raised. However, the meeting's consensus was one of
qualified support of the UDAG pending final ratification of the jobs
issue (UDAG Tes t i mony, 4/15/80). The construction workers, while pleased
with the prospect of employment, feared that the stringent resident
requirements wo~1ld jeopardize jobs for the ailing industry (Globe, 4/16/80).
As Teri Weidner, spokesperson for UIDC, observed, the heavy steelworkers
are not from the city of Boston - many are not even

resident~

of the

State. Union3 will not allow the unqualified to work, so the developer
voiced concern over strict residency requirements as well at subsequent
UDAG hearings on April 28 and 29.
The deadline for application was April 30. The adamant stance
. .

. .

-

taken by the City and 11itched by Mayor vn1i te was jobs for residen+.s.
Affirmative a c tion guidelines were included in the MTA lease, as mentioned
previously, but ·the City was holding out for residency. \ofhite, in a press
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conference, told reporters, "I want this project in Boston. But I also
want

50;~

of the jobs from the project to

go

to Bostonians. I feel strongly

about this issue, a:nd we are negotiating now. It is an obstacle which
could jeopardize the future of the Copley Place project" ( Herald American,

4/10/so).
The newspapers followed the pr ogress of, the negotiations throughout
the last week of April. 'Ihe consensus seemed to be that everyone wanted
f

the project, but with that important "if." Th~ developer argued that the
!
I

a f fi r mative a ction requirements set in the Air Rights Lease were precedent-setting, and strict enough. UIDC

~ ould

onl y try to meet percentage

goa.ls fo r permanent jobs , and could not meet those percentages for construction jobs because of a challenge by ihe construction industry that
was then in court (Weidner interview). The construction industry had
brought Sl_lit against the City in challenge to -Mayor White's Executive
Order requi£ing 50'/J of construction jobs be given to residents.

ur:rx;

did

not want to be caught in the middle of the legal battle, and preferred

.

to sidestep the requirements, and specify goals instead. It was that
difference between the developer's goals and the city's requirements
that was the difference between aiming at a target and hitting it.
· According to an analysis of the negotiations printed in the Boston
Ledger, the jobs agreement hold-up was making everyone unhappy (Ledger,
Week of

4/18-24/80). UIDC was unhappy because it wanted to make the April

30 UDAG deadline to avoid another 3-month dea.ly in the project,'s groundbreaking (UDAGs are awarded .quarterly). The communtty was unhappy because
they were exciuded from the negotiation, and could only testify at infrequent public hearings. The BRA was unhappy because it feared another
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"Zuckerman" (Zuckerman was the developer who walked out of the Park
Plaza project about which the City was so sensitive), and because the
a gency was caught between the developer, the mayor, the legal challenge,
and the community residents.
The public hear ings held on April 28 and 29, at sessions of the
Council Committeeon Planning and Development were emotion filled. The
11th hour nego tiations caused some complaint from those who felt that
they di d no t have adequate time to review the final UDAG application
(Globe, 4/29/80 ). Councilman Ray Fl ynn blamed the lack of time on the :B"?.A ,
and on the day before t he submission deadline, he threatened to vote
against the application in order to fully review the terms (Globe, 4/29/80).
The Committee reported out the Application on the evening of
April 29. The final application had several amendments attached pertaining
to the jobs agreement and the financing schedule. The application was
sent t o the full City Council for consideration

o~

the 30th. The jobs

agreement, was decided as goals for hiring residents, rather than the
requirements. The hiring goals for construction call for 5<:r;6 of the
jobs for J3oston residents ,

35;~

for minorities, and 1076 for women. The

Attainment of the goals would be monitored by a committee composed of
union and contr a ctor i nterests. The only requirements were tho se pertainipg
to affirmative a.ction, already agreed upon in the Air Rights Lease.
The agreement set goals of hiring Boston residents for 5o:ifo of the
6000 permanent jobs resulting from the project. The developeD ·agreed to
encourag-e future tenants to abide by these goals, which include 5076 of
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jobs for women and

30%

for minority. Detaib on enforcing the goals

were not arranged at the time of the UDAG application. Instead, it was
decided that Mayor White would meet with the major tenants and work out
individual agreements. According to Robert Ryan, Director of the BRA,
the jobs agreements "will reach the City's goals" (Globe, 4/29/80).
On April 309 "!;he ful l Council unanimously approved the UDAG application on the recommendation of the Committee on Planning and

Develope~ent.

Several councilmen, while voting affirmatively for the UDAG, voiced
reservations concerning the project. Councilman John Sears expressed
dissatisfaction with the design and environmental issues. Councilman
Ray Flynn brought up the Tent City issue, in concert with State Representative Mel King, in a statement vowing to "sink the project" if the
BRA did not follow through with assurances that Tent City would be
developed. The BRA made a commitment to build subsidized housing on
the site, and indicated that HUD

would look favorably on an application

for federal funds to make Tent City work (Globe, 4/30/80).
The problem for the developer at this point was project financing.
The City submitted the UDAG contingent upon the provision of information
pertaining to financing (UIDC, 1980, P.13). The lack of this information
\

resulted in a postponement of HUD review until the next funding period
deadline, June 30.
During May and June, UIDC devoted its full attention to bringing
project feasibility to a level tmt would allow for the necessary presentations to permanent lenders. UIDC could not secure the bulk of its
financing because of incomplete design development and environmental
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impact studies, unresolve.d arch! tectural and engineerir

1;ork, and

outstanding permits and approvals from the City (UIDC, 1980, p.13).
Again, however, the developer was unable to supply the necessary financing
information to HUD by the deadline, and petitioned HUD for another delay,
until September 30.
By mid-August, UIDC had secured the financial commitments needed

for the UDAG review. Financing for the project is arranged by Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company of New York, the First National Bank of Chicago,
and Citibank, N.A. of New York. The investment capital is provided for
by the above lead banks and the First National Bank of Boston, Security
Pacific National Bank of Los Angeles, and Seattle First National Bank
(UIDC, 1981). The financial arrangements were written into the UDAG
application, which was considered by HUD on September 30, 1980.
An administrative complaint was filed on June

5 by several com-

munity groups to protest the UDAG application. The complaint, filed with

HUD, claimed that: 1) Bos ton was not eligible for UDAG funds (based on
litigation regarding the segregated characteristics of Boston's housing
policies); 2) Copley Place did not require a UDAG subsidy (UIDC has
assets totaling $1 billion); and, 3) negative environmental impacts,
and displacement will result from the project (Administrative Complaint,
1980).
The BRA began preparation of a response to 1he complaint, and filed
a rebuttal on August 11. The response addressed each issue in detail,
ani defended the project as one that would "leverage substantial private
investment to the direct and indirect benefit of low-and moderate-
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income people, especially members of minority groups" (BRA, 1980, p.iv).
At UIDC, the design development process was the summer's activity.
By July, 1980, the design was complete, containing ihe same mix of uses,
the same elements, and the same layout as had been defined in the UDAG
and the Draft EIR/EIS (note: the Draft EIR/EIS was submitted to the State
in Febraary, 1980, and was considered at a public hearing in March,
1980). The detailed design was a bit larger, however, increasing appro~
imately

7%

(UIDC, 1980, p.14).

Three separate design reviews were required for final approval.
Held during July and August, the reviews were conducted by the BRA,
representing the City; the Massachusetts gistorical Commission, holding
a 106 review of the development's impact on the abutting South End Historical District, and the CRC Design Review Subcommittee (DRSC), upon
whose recommendation the MTA would rely for their decision, representing
the State (UIDC, 1980~ p.14).
~e

DRSC completed review of the design

an~made

their recom-

mendations to the full CRC and the MTA officials on September 24, 1980.
They raised Objections concerning several of the architectural features
of the project, including the use of large areas of synthetic materials
on blank walls, the lack of relation to the surrounding area, and the
apparent di~couragement of pedestrian use of the complex (Globe, 10/3/80).
Other points raised by the DRSC relate to the expected environmental
problems such as high winds and shadows across Copley Square. However,
the MTA ignored the DRSC concerns, mid gave unqualified approval to the
final design (Globe, 10/3/80).
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1'he B::tA gave appr oval to the s chematic design on September 22,
1980, but reserved final approval on "numerous design issues • . •• not. • •
fully resolved to date between the City and UIDC" (BRA, 9/22/80). The
BRA listed nine open design items to be negotiated, and reserved the
right to withhold UDAG money until the issues are resolved.
The Mas sachusetts Historical Commission (MHC) gave qualified
approval to the design in the 106 review procedure. The MHC's role in
the review is to evaluate the desiBD of Copley Place in relation to the
surrounding historic structures (the Boston Public Library, i:he Trinity
Church and the South End browns tones.). The Commission has agreed tothe
overall de s ign but is invol ved in an ongoing review of the more detailed
design elements as they a r e amended (Joseph Orphant interview).
With most of the s teps either completed or underway, UIDC waited
for the UDAG approval. Construction of the project was contingent upon
the Federal money to perform the necessary site preparation work. As
anticipated, the UDAG was approved on October 2, 1980, clearing one of
the last major hurdles for project realization. The announcement of the
approval came through Senator Edward Kennedy's office (D-Massachusetts),
signaling the largest amount for a single UDAG in the history of the
program.
The only matter unresolved was the transfer of land between the
City and the MTA. Two parcels of city-owned land were to be transferred
in order to enable UIDC to move Stuart Street slightly south and
enlarge a triangular parcel on which one of the hotels is to be built
(Globe, 11/6/80). The City Council gave approval to the land transfer on
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November 5, which allowed UI:DC to schedule groundbreaking ceremonies.
Councilman Sears, voicing concerns shared by the defunct DRSC, warned
that the project did not promote pedestrian access. He had submitted
an amendment tot he land transfer legislation requiring that a sidewalk
be built along the new Stuart Street. The amendment also called for
reactivization of the DRSC.
The MTA had threatened to revoke the lease and withold the site if
the sidewalk were required. The sidewalk would cr oss at the turnpike
exit ramp and would result in tra ffic problems, according to MTA Chairman
Driscoll (Globe, 11/6/80). The renewal of the D~SC was ieft as an amendment
to the land transfer, but the City Council then passed a separate resolution that stated that the citizen design review function had been met.
The BRA had met with "concerned citizens" on November 3, 1980 to discuss
the design.
One week later, UIDC held the official groundbreaking of Copley
Place. On November 13, 1980, over 400 people listened as guestspeak:ers
heralded t he historic event. The featured speakers were Thomas Klutznick,
Chairman of the "Board of UIDC, Governor King, Mayor White, and MTA
Chai rman Dris coll . Reference wa s made to

t~e

bene f its t hat would result

from Co~ley Place, including the tax benefits (the 121A request had
been denied) and t he job crea.tion. The State and local tax revenues
will runount to $27 million per year, and the payroll for the permanent
jobs will be $96 million, in 1979 dollars (Weidner interview).
~be

remaining issues that complicate Copley Place are the law-
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suit brought by eight South End residmts andihe unresolved design
elements. Both issues are delaying the transfer of the UDAG money from
the City to

urnc.

The resolution of the lawsuit is undetermined.

U.S. District

Court Judge Andrew Cafferty refused to dismiss the case after a motion
for summa.27 judgement was filed by HUD. In so doing, Judge Cafferty
stated that HUD failed to establish that it had the "relevant racial
and socio-economic .information" it needed at the time of the UDAG review
(Memorandum, 8/17/81). A trial date has not yet been set, although a
date is expected to be announced sometime in May, 1982.
The unresolved design issues hoLding the tr.DAG funds (received by
the BRA in May, 1981) were outlined in the preliminary approval of
September 22, 1980. Of the nine points stated, five have been resolved
(DiLeo intsrvi.ew). The remaining issues concern the blank wall, the
design of the housing component, the entrance to the community retail
space, and the nature of the plaza on Stuart Street. According to Teri
Weidner, the design pro cess is expected to be long and involved. The
fine r detail

matte~s

that remain unresolved do not affect the construction ·

s chedule. Construction work is continuing at the Copley Place site,
giving the impression that UIDC is confident that the outcome of the
lawsuit and the design issues will be positive.
'lbe future for Copley Place, after five yea.rs of negotiation between

all levels of government, community, and private interests, is uncertain.
As the process continues, cost estimates have mushroomed from the
original estimate of

~ 295

million to the current figure of $400 million.
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v.

Analyi:; i s a.nd r.onclusion

The Copley Place project is underway; the construction Achedule
is being followed, and an opening date of 1984 is anticipated. A full
evaluation of project success is not possible until completion of the
construction phase and start up of operation. However, for the most part,
the negotiations process which set the stage for implementation of the
project is completed- (except for the unresolved design issues). A preliminary assessment of the public sector role in the process can be made.
The State, the first public sector actor/negotiator, had the ultimate card in its hand to leverage and shape the type of private inveestment p·r oposed by UIDC - o1'1nership of the strategically situated land.
U!DC could not complete any project without a parcel in a prime location
on which to build. From the initial stages of negotiation, the State
could threaten to

wit~old

the land in order to design the project to

maximum public benefit. The crucial decision to lease the parcel rather
than sell guaranteed state leverage up to the signing of a lease agreement.
Frank Keefe, in reflecting on the State's role in the negotiating

'

process, emphasized the advantage df state ownership and the notion of
leasing the property. He states that, "The economics worked to our
advantage.

We were able to talk with the developer in terms of phasing

the rent payments. As a result of escalating the rent payments over time,
the developer did not have to capitalize his purchase of the land

~··

We

were able in the bar.gaining to say to them, 'Look, you don't have to take
down the land from Day One'" (Hollister, 1980, p.53). A mutually beneficial
"deal" was worked out. The State and City gained a major, tax producing
develo-pmen t ; ~JIDC gained the opportunity to construct an enoti11ously
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profitable pr oject.
The State completed its role in the negotiations in December of
1978, but the Copley Place groundbreaking did not occur for another
2 years. The public sector actor/negotiator during this second phase
was the City of Boston, represented by the BRA. The assessment of the
second phase entails the actual implementation of the project (the
entering into the construction phase), the financing, and the final
design development. What role did the BHA play? How did it choose to
appr oach the negotiating table? How did the BF.A become involved?
The City was a passive participant early in .the negotiations.
Two reasons exist for this ''wait and see" attitude. The first reason is
that technically the City was not involved in the process at that point.
UIDC needed to secure a parcel before continuing with the part of the
development process that would involve the City in a more active way
the per.nit approval procedure. The second reason is more political,
dealing with personalities and individual loyalties. When UIDC initially approached the State with the idea of Copley Place, they were
i

associated with the Great Bay Company, a development firm started by
J)D.n Gifford. Gifford formed a joint venture with UID0 to develop

Cop~

y

Place, and acted as their .local agent in the early months of the process.
Mayor White had dealt with Gifford befere, in connection with the Park
Plaza fiasco. Gifford represented a development firm other than the one
chosen, the firm owned by Mort Zuckerman - White's personal friend.
White withheld the City's. support of Copley Place as long as Gifford
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was involved. On a visit to UIDC's Chicago ·development, Water Tower
Place, White let it be known "that Gifford's connection with the project would not help it secure the necessary approvals from the city"
(Hollister, 1980, p.40).
A related factor to the Mayor's initial cold shoulder is found
in his friendship with Zuckerman. As mentioned earlier, both the city
and the state were sensitive to the failure of Park Plaza just a couple
of years earlier. However, Zucke:rinan blamed the prospect of Copley Place
being built and the state's open-a:rin attitude toward UIDC for problems
he experienced with his Park Plaza proposal. The Copley Place proposal
and its Westin Hotel represented competition to his development (Sollimter,
1980, p.40) • .WhH'l, out of loyalty to his friend, echoed Zuckerman's view,

and kept a distance from Copley Place (Keefe interview).
However, when Gifford was no longer associated with the project,
and Zuckerman's feelings were sufficiently healed, White authorized
more active involvement in the process. According to Keefe, the city
sent observers only to the early CRC meetins as pass1ve representatives
of its interests. However, with Gifford gone in early 1978, Robert Ryan,
Director of the BP.A, became directly i nvolved. At this point, Keefe said
that White wanted r.opley Place to succeed for the city. Politically,
White had been on the losing end of two major develop:ruants in Boston:
the Charlestown Navy Yard project, against which White fought, was
implementtl anyway; the Park Plaza developme.nt, for which White . was a
vigorous supporter, bad failed. Keefe said, "Copley was to be Kevin's
(White's) success. " (Keefe interview).

36
The BRA's active participation began after the MTA signed the
Air RJght's Lease with UI:rx::. With Dukakis administrati~n actors, Keefe
and Salvucci, out of the picture (due to the King victory), the only
remaining sta t e actor was John Driscoll, Chairman of the MTA. His
term overlapped the administrations. · According to· the BRA Project Coordinator of Copley Pl a ce, Lucas DiLeo, there was a leadership role which
Driscoll did not fill. The city filled the void and took up the leadership role enthusiastically. Ryan, ERA Director, speaks of the agency as
"shifting away from its

1

60's and 70's main role of directing and chan-

neling heavy public investments into the city in order to encourage tax
yielding private investment, to a role as manager of the pending private
investments, as financial analysts in determining whether the city would
(

even want or need future building investment, and attempting to further
strengthen its role as a city planning agency" (Globe, 1/11/81). The
BRA was ready to be a manager of Copley Place.
The City came to t he negotiating table wanting a number of goals
achieved. Primarily, the City wanted revenues and jobs for residents.
The City also was looking for hotels to help promote tourism and convention
business in Boston. Also, the uniqueness of Copley Place - the mixed-use,
innovatively designed structure - was appealing (Lewis interview). The

BHA sew the site as barren and underutilized; paying no taxes; providing
no jobs; offering no housing, shopping or other services. The Copley
Place project, with millions of private investment dollars, would
"transform this wasteland into a vibrant urban resource" (BRA, 1980, p.1).
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I

The BRA saw a great opportunity to realize these objectives.
In order to achieve the goals mentioned above, the City employed
the leverage tools available to them - the UDAG and the design review
proces~.
o~ment

The BRA used these to monitor the Copley Place program devel-

for benefits to the City. To f a cilitate the pe=mit approval

processeR that were necessary, the BRA provided guidance to UIDC in
working with the various city agencies (Lewis interview). Rather than
throwing up red flags, the BRA exercised a little more cooperation in the
process. The priority in approving the development program was speed to
accomodate the developer's schedule - but always with the City's interests.
The BRA could have slowed each step, losing direction in a bureaucratic
quagmire typical of some public-private ventures. The tactic employed
instead kept negotiations more open.
Nevertheless, how crucial the presence of the BRA was in the
planning of the Copley Place project is open to sane discussion. Keefe,
the State Planner who led negotiations up to the lease slgning, feels
that the City had no significant impact on the shape or form of Copley
Place (Keefe interview). The critical planning issues were decided
before the BRA crune into play. Copley Place, "probably the most successful planning project in Boston", according to Keefe, was settled by the
state participants.
The only legitimate objective that the city had was "seeing the
project through," continued Keefe. The urban design and community issues
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were resolved: the EIR/ElS process was at the state level (until federal
funds became involved, at which time a federal EIS was necessary), and
the CRC was a state-sponsered entity. The CRC function ended in May 1979
in .accordance with their contract with the MTA.
Keefe said that in t he beginning of the process, there was no
flak regarding the development. The problems between the public and
private interests came later with t he inclusion of Tent City as. an issue
and the UDAG application. However, politically aware, the state tried
"to make it Kevin's (White's) project from the beginning, so he wouldn't
sabotage it later on" (Keefe interview). The BRA, riding on the coattails
of

th~

state's planning and negotiation, was able to embrace a success

story and appear to make i t its own, continued Keefe.
Whether or not Keefe is correct in his opinions of the BRA's role
in shaping Copley Place, the BRA role as UDAG applicant cannot be dis-

regarded. The BRA was

abl~

to negotiate with

UID~

over social issues of

employment opportunity and housing. As presented ear lier, Ylhite was
clear during t he UDAG talks that he stood behind a policy of benefits
for residents. Tne UTIAG money was necessary for project completion, and
the BP.A used that fact as a lever in

the beginning of terms.

The UDAG application process gave the city the opportunity to achieve
its goals for Boston residents. With public financial subsidy, public
benefit must follow. The UDAG program requires that a project benefits
low income groups, and the application provided both a way to secure more
mogs - and more importantly, a way to finance future neighborhood invest.:ment. The City used the UDAG to go beyond the immediate boundaries of
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the Copley

Pl a~ e

:.ite, as the benefits

resulting from the project will

be city-wide. The city has documented, with independent consulting
studies to confirm, .that eny nega tive impacts resulting from the project
are outweighed by the positive. To mitigate the negative impacts, the
city intends to utilize funds created from the UDAG itself, accrued from
the

ur:rx::

loon

payba~k.

The presence of the payback fund is a key to HUD's approval of
the UDAG, says Frank Smizik, lawyer for the South End residents suing
HUD. He feels that RUD was not convinced that UID'J needed the money for
project feasibility, but that a payback of $15 million of the UDAG, with
interest, seemed to justify the proposal (Smizik interview). The leverage
of private monies with the

~ublic

dollars was a 15:1 ratio at the time of

the application. UDAG guidelines specify only a 5: or 6:1 ratio as necessary. The tremendous difference could be indicative of UI:rx:: not really
needing such a comparatively small amount, or it could be indicative of
needing that money as a seed to leverage the remainder of private financing.
In any event, the payback was a sweetner in the decision - for the
BP.A as well. The prospect of $42 million over the next 25 odd years is

strong incentive to apply for a federal grant. The BRA realizes, along

'

with everyone else, that the future of massive federal subsidy is uncertain with the Reagan administration and the economic downturn. The
Copley Place UDAG provides public investment capital for the future so
that Boston does not have to rely exclusively on unpredictable

yea~

to

year support.
'lbe BRA will have discretion with the Neighborhood Development Fund.

\.
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The good intentions detailed in the Copley Place UDAG defense may or not
come to realization. Smizik, in outlining justification for his client's
case, fears that the fund will be used to finance more job creation
for the professional (Smizik interview). 'Ihe BRA used
reasoning" and disregarded some of

11

11

fallaci9us

the facts and figures" in their

defense of the UDAG. In order to promote jobs, the BRA glossed over the
real housing issues such as displacement. He feels that the same will
occur in the future when considering projects to fund. The problem is
based upon the fact that the BRA has contact with developers rather than
the community (Smizik interv ie\.f ).
Re sidents of the South End illlJ)act a r eas voiced their opinion of
the lTDAG at the public hearings held during the application approval
process. Kenneth Campbell, resident and member of the Ellis Neighborhood
Association, asked "whether we should subsidize a profit-making commercial developnent in order that it can build a v:ery large project that
will help disintegrate the multi-racial, multi-class, multi-ethnic
neighborhood" (Testimony, 1979, p.38). Bill Abbott, resident, stated
that giving $18.8 million to this project is "an example of socialism
'\

for the rich and an example· of nothing for everybody else" (Testimony.

1979, p.164).
These allegations are not at this point proven. The views held by
Smizik and the South End residents he represents will be considered in
a court of law. Yet, the fact that the BRA used the UDAG as a means to
create the neighborhood fund is undisputed. The effectiveness of ihe
fund in overcoming what the BRA refers to as "natural demographic changes"
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rather than displacement, will be determined at some future date (BRA,

1980, p.ii). A judgement now would be premature.
The use of the UDAG as a leveraging tool for jobs was a second
example of bargaining for public benefit. Disregarding for a moment
that strong affirmative action provisions for construction were already
included in the MTA lease, the city did attE!llpt to extend the provisions
to permanent jobs. The Boston Globe editorialized that "it is a sign of
the city's strength that it is able to negotiate wlth a major developer
on allied questions relating to the creation of job opportunities for
Boston residents" (Globe, 4/30/80). The White administration was successful in a 507·6 resident job agreement with a high technology firm Teradyne,
Inc. moving into Boston (with the leverage of a federal grant) earlier
in 1930. The Copley Place agreement would be commercial rather than
industrial developl!ent, and would set a precedent for resident-jobs
agreement for future development of that type.
Unfortunately, the city was unable to secure guaranteed resident
jobs. The agreement settled upon in ihe UDAG outlines goals rather than
'\

required quotas. The permanent job provisions are vague. For one resident,
Copley Place is no different than other developments that promise jobs to
the neighborhood: "They said jobs. They said jobs - the Prudential. You
big f!JJ.YS been talkin' about jobs for so long ain't nobody gonna believe
you anymore" (UDAG Testimony,
,

1~79,

p.150).

The jobs issue was, as Weidner of UIDC referred to it, a ''hang up

with the city." She holds that the affinnative action guidelines in the
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MTA lease, for construction, are unprecedented, and in fact exceeded
those called for by the city. The MTA lease requires

2CY'~

jobs for

minorities during construction, while the UDAG agreements merely set
goals. Compliance with the requirements is monitored by the MTA; the
attaimnent of the goals set by the city would be monitored by a
committee of e s t e.blished contractor and union interests. The Boston Jobs
Coe.l i tion, the pr incipal advocate of resi dent-jobs, is excluded from
the oversight committee. Therefore, the committee's composition is
questionable.
Keefe, in reflecting on the MTA lease said that the affirmative
action requirements are "revolutionary" (Keefe interview). The lease
tenns provide for a recruitment office and review mechanism. He feels
that the city tried to make the jobs agreements their own, and attmepted
to retrace the state's steps to replicate an agreement for the city's
personal credit. Nevertheless, jobs will be created in great number, and
if the goals are met, they will aggregate 2034 tor low and moderate
income, 1261 for CETA - eligibles, and 1512 for minorities, as specified
in the UDAG agreement (signed by Mayor White 2/24/81).
Heralding the Copley Place development, Mayor White claimed that
"the terms of this grant provide a national model for building a financial
bridge between the downtown and the neighborhood. This model assures that
future downtown development will benefit this city's neighborhoods, both
directly in terms of jobs for our people and indirectly through the
money which will be funnelled into the Neighborhood Development Fund"
(Globe, 4/10/80). To the outside observer, the project appears to be
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successful. As opposed to Park Plaza, the city reached an agreement with
the developer in just two years. For the most part, the project succeeded
in accomodating the conflicting goals of numerous participants in the
process. The design components include low-income housing and oommunity
retail snace; the construction phase guarantees jobs for minorities;
goals have been set to target permanent jobs to residents; over $40 million
will be returned to the city through the loan payback; the city will
receive at loo.st

f7

million annually in tax revenues; and finally, UIDC ·

will own one of the most unique downtown development projects in the
country.
The "vibrant urban resource" being created at Copley Place will
have both positive and negative impacts. Not everyone will be satisfied
with the end result, but the benefits for the city will extend beyond the
boundaries of the site. That a developemnt of its size would be ventured
in :Boston is a credit to the ability of the city to accept and work with
the private sector.

The outlook for :Boston's bu1lding expansion is good;

according to a Globe article, the city is "in the midst of a $1 billion
construction boom which will extend into 1982 and 1983 and beyond" (Globe,

1/11/81). The city, working though the BRA, has committed itsdf

to

approving development based on what it "has to offer in terms of maximum
job opportunities for Boston residents and in terms of minimizing local
public investment, and in gaining agreements with builders to conform to
city planning strategies aimed at channeling building investment into
those areas the planners feel need the benefits of new construction, even
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though the

~evelopers

would rather build in the downtown financial area

only" (Globe, 1/11/81 ).
The problem for the city and the BRA is to make certain that these
"city planning strategies" do not ignore the vitality of the neighborhocds. The rhetoric of a financial bridge between the downtown and the
neighbor· oods must :ass the press conference stage and move into implementation. The Neighborhood Development Fund and jobs created by Copley
Place proviea real economic justification for pursuing a downtown development policy.
The key to the success of the doW!ltown building boom and the massive
infusion of private dollars is a mental climate that respects private
uea.lth and a.tt:raets it iote :projects that will benefit the people of
Boston. As said by John Ryan, former member of the ''Boston Planning
Board," (sic), "The human links that this development (Copley Place)
proposes and that this development can accomplish for linking neighborhoods is a very significant part of joining important neighborhoods
in Boston. This project will close scars left by construction of the
Turnpike Extension 15 years ago and will provide the city with tax
revenue and economic activity where neither exists now. The role of the
city is properly in place here in supporting investment both on a city
and the state and federal level ... . . to benefit the city on the whole"
(Testimony, 1979, p.88).
The benefits gained from any project as massive as Copley Place;
the impacts felt by the numbers of people nearby; the physical alteration
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-

to the geographic area - these circumstances will be far reaching for
Boston and the metropolitan area. For as many persons who support Copley
Place, there are as many who discount its value. ''Large scale development
is a two-edged sword" (Globe, 10/15/80). A judgement as to the absolute
success or failure of Copley Place and the role of the public sector in
the implementation of the project is reserved for analysis at another
time. But what can be learned is the complexity of public-private development ventures, an.d .the availability of leveraging tools to guide and
shape investment to

~ublic

benefit.

Economic growth, devoi d of economi c development poli cies, does not
help the r.ommunity.

H o~ever,

when a public agency intervenes to shape

and expand its "' Cope to embrace a broe.der social context, as the BRA did
with Copley Place, urba.n economic policy implementation begi ns to dull toe
sharp edge of the ae velopment sword. The innovative techniques exercised
by the BRA may or may not prove to be the most beneficial to each resident
of Boston, but they go a long way in the attempt to ensure that victims
of economic growth are not too badly injured.
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On April 18, th~ Massachusetts TuFnpike Authority entered into a six-ll'Dn.th
Memrandum of Unders tandil}g (M.O. U.) with Great Bay Co. and Urban Inves txrent and De ·1velopment Company (UIDC) during which Great Bay Co. and UIDC will ".lgage in engineering and market analyses .ind the Turnpike Authority will refuse to negotiate or lea5e
its Copley Square land and air ri ghts to any other party. A 60-j.sy period beyond the
six months is provided in which Great Bay Co., UIOC, and the Turnpike Authcrity must
execute an option agreement.. If no such agreement is reached, the obligations of the
Ur\u
nu
te rmi na te.
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In order to guarantee that the bes t interests of the Commonweal th, City, and
the adjacent neighborhoods are served, the Governor has asked that the Develclp1:1ent
Cabinet take the lead role during the six-nxmth analysis in evaluating environmental
constraints and community desires. 1he Office of State Planning wil~ coordinate the
involvement of the Development Cabinet to ensure tin t the views and values of neighborhood groups and city offJcials are integrated into both <lesig11 and environmental
studies. The Turnpike Authocit:; will '2 nter irlto rnnr.racts for ,· o ns ultant services to
be available to the Development C::ibinet and U!c Ci t izens Ad'."isory S r0uµ or. design, environmental, and connnuni ty issues.
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At the end of six months, ev.::ryone 1.'ill h.'.l v~ a full understanding 01 the ccnstrain ts and opportunitiP.s at Copley S q uan: . ,! nil a decision can be made by b •) th the
developer and the state a nd the ci t y pub.lie sector agencies as t «' whether it makes
sense to proceed into an option.
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'T his decision-making ;Hocess is rl!fl~ctive of the Jesire of state and city
governmt:?nt to work directly and coop er;1tivcly \..'i th an interested d0veloper of proven
record on a site with signif icanc: development imp(: dime nts while l!nsuring full and
active participation by public agencies and Ct'n:munity t:roups to promote an appropriate
and acceptable project.
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Citizen~

Review Committee
List of Meetings

Information and Concerns
May 19:
June 2:
June 9:
.,
June I~:
June 23:
June 30:

Orientation
Legal and Traffic Issues
Physical Constraints
Development Economics, Business Impact, and
Community Economic Development
Scheduling and Summary
Traffic Working Group
Interim Report Distribution

Recommendation Development

September 8:
September 16:
September 22:

Community Economic Development
St. Botolph Working Group
Impact on Back Bay Busine~ses
Working Group on Business O~portunities
Working Group on Jobs and Training
Preliminary Physical Design Presentation
Working Group on Business Opportunities
Neighborhood Stabilization
Working Group on Business Opportunities and Jobs
Draft Recommendations and Revised Schematic
Design
Comments and Revisions of Draft submitted to CRC
Discussion of Revisions
Recommendation ·submitted to State, MBTA, developer

June 15:
July 6:
July lJ:
July 20:
July 26:
August 3:
August 10:

Introductory Meeting
Environmental Impact Review
Pedestrian and Design Issues
Economic Impact
Traffic Impact
Socia 1 Impact
Summary Meeting and Recommendations

July 7:
July 13:
July 14:
July 15:
July 26:
July 28:
July 29:
August 4:
August 12:
August 18:

'\

B.-z.
February 22:
May 24:
May 31:
June 14:
June 27:
July 12:
August 2:
August 9:
August 16 :
August 30:
September 6 :
September 20:
November 8:
November 12:
November 15:

March 6:
Apri 1 14:
July 17:
September 24:

Review of necessity for Copley Place re-study
General meeting to start new round of CRC
meetings (UIDC handout #1)
Review of new design and program (UIDC handout #2)
Review of pub! ic benefits and public funding
requirements (UIDC handout #3)
Transportation planning issues - session 1,
Methodologies (UIDC handout #4)
Environmental issues - session 1. Outline of
proposed EIR/EIS (UIDC handout #5)
Review of scope of services for retail and
housing impact studies (No handout for meeting
#6)
Transportation Planning issues - session I I
( UIDC handout #7)
Design review and housing review (No handout
for meeting #8)
Environmental issues - session I I. Geology,
energy conservation, noise, historic properties,
wind, air quality (UIDC handout #9)
Environmental issues - session Ill. Traffic
and air quality (UIDC handout #10)
Workshop on housing impact report. (ERA handout no UI DC handout)
Meeting on Pub! ic Approvals Process
Meeting on Retail Impact Study
Meeting on Housing Impact Study

EIR/EIS Review
UDAG Review
Design Review Subcommittee kick-off; project
update
Design Review Subcommittee report to the CRC

.
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C. 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

I.

Introduction

Copley Place is an exemplary project which deserves HUD's support through
the Urban Development Action Grant Program. At present the site is a
barren and underutilized turnpike interchange. It pays no taxes , provides
no jobs , offers no housing , shopping or other services. The proposed project,
through t h e inf u sion of $300 million in private funds , will transform this
wasteland into a vibrant urban resource. When it is completed, it will provide
more than 6,000 permanent jobs, many to presently unemployed Boston residents,
as well as millions of dollars in taxes to the City and State . It will house
100 families of mix ed-income and races and will serve as a unifying force for
neighborhoods that have been separated by physical barriers for over a
hundred years.
The planning process for Copley Place has also been exemplary. The developer
has worked with community groups, public agencies and individuals over a
three year period to produce a project which is responsive to the concerns of
the surrounding neighborhoods. As a result of this process a number of
significant changes were made in the project proposal.

,;

..
'

Copley Place will be an as set to the City as a whole and to the surrounding
. neighborhoods in particular. Contrary to the assertions contained in the
Administrative Complaint, Copley Place will have at most a minimal effect upon
housin g in t h e s u rrounding n eighborhoods . The changes taking place in
these neighbor hoods are due to a variety of demographic forces, some of
which are national in scope. The City believes that an objective evaluation of
all aspects of this project will show conclusively that Copley Place should
receive UDAG fu n ding .
II.

·:

Boston is . An Eligible Applicant for UDAG Funds

The City meets all criteria for UDAG eligibility.
(a)

It meets the minimum standards of physical and economic distress .

(b) It has an outstanding record in providing housipg for persons of lowand moderate-income.
(c)

It has demonstrated results in providing equal opportunity for low- and
moderate-income persons and members of minority groups. In particular,
the City is in substantial compliance with the conditions on its most
recent Community Development Block Grant.

III.

UIDC Does Require UDAG Funds to Construct Copley Place

A UDAG grant in the amount of $19,724,000 has been determined to be warranted by the Boston Redevelopment Authority's review of the Copley Place
project. The City recognizes the large up-front costs inherent in developing
this site which have succeeded in keeping this parcel vacant for the past two
decades. These activities add greatly to the construction costs of the developi
- · --·-,--
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-- -- .

----·~

•
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mcnt witho u t adding directly to the cash flow of the project. To confirm its
analysis , the BRA retained an independent consultant which has advis e d it
that the project sponsor's cost estimates and income projections are reasonable
and that, based on these estimates , the project would not reach a fair level
of return without such a UDAG investment.
Contrary to the complainant's allegation, the developer was exploring funding
sources for public improvement type activities in the Spring of 1978 and
actively addressing public assistance for the development in the Fall of that
year.
The ratio of private investment to UDAG funds will be 15 to 1, far exceeding
HUD guidelin, ..
IV.

The Boston City Council Did Act Upon the Application With Sufficient
Information to Evaluate the Project's Impact Upon the City and Its Residents

The UDAG application meets all HUD requirements for public review and
approval by the local governing body, which in fact voted unanimously to
submit the application. · More important, the planning of the project involved
unprecedented public review from the very beginning. Over 40 Citizen
Review Committee meetings were held over three years with neighborhood
groups to review the project and obtain their input. As a result of these
meetings major changes were made in many aspects of the project and significant affirmative action provisions achieved.
V.

Copley Place Will Not Have A Negative Impact On the Special Problems
Of Low- and Moderate-Income and Minority People

The overall impact of Copley Place will be positive through the provis10n of
jobs and housing for low- and moderate-income people, taxes to support City
services, and loan repayments by the developer that will support neighborhood
development ·projects. While there may be modest impacts in terms of increased
demand for housing which may contribute to displacement, this effect is
expected to be minimal and the City has policies which will be able to mitigate
even these forces.
A.

'

'\

Housing and Displacement
1.

The Administrative Complaint confuses natural demographic changes
with displacement.

2.

The City is meeting its obligations to minimize the effects of any
displacement which may occur.

3.

Displacement is a complex phenomenon, not well understood. What
is happening in the neighborhoods surrounding the Copley Place
site is the result of many different factors, some of them national in
scope, others more localized. These neighborhoods were in a
serious state of physical and economic distress for decades (cf
extensive documentation submitted to HUD to qualify the South End,
Fenway and South Cove as urban renewal areas) and have only
recently begun to show signs of renewed vigor . Thanks to significant expenditure by the Federal, State and local governments , the
most serious physical blight has been eliminated, public works and
ii
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facilities improved, and over 6, 200 units of new or substantially
rehal'ilitated housing has been provided in the impact area for lowand moderate-income people. A recent survey of the South End
neighborhood indicates overwhelming approval by the residents for
the changes which have taken place and a hope that revitalization
will continue. Displacement as an issue was articulated by only 3%
of the population.
4.

There is no evidence that Copley Place will cause any displacement,
though there will certainly be some additional demand for housing
caused by the project's employees. The best estimates are that this
impact will be small in the immediate area (within a 15-minute walk)
an .. so dispersed outside ·that area as to be unmeasurable. Many of
the jobs generated by the project will go to present residents of
the area or the City of Boston, including people who are presently
unemployed, underemployed, or not in the labor market. The
experience with other major developments in this area - which did
have a significant effect on housing demand - does not apply today.
Those developments took place at a time when housing prices in the
impact area were relatively low and constituted a major inducement
to immigration. This is no longer the case.

5.

The South End, the area most frequently cited in the Administrative
Complaint, has been subject to a great many changes in recent
decades. It is not at all clear that what is happening there could
be called displacement. It certainly is clear that throughout the
period when displacement was allegedly taking place, large numbers
of Blacks and Hispanics were moving into the area. Since this is
not a phenomenon normally associated with displacement, it suggests
that a more complex process is underway and that any generalizations
about the impact of Copley Place are subject to qualifications.

6.

Should there be any displacement as a result of Copley Place, the
City does already have programs in place to address this problem.
There already exist in the surrounding neighborhoods 6, 200 units
of new or substantially rehabilitated subsidized housing. The
existence of this housing guarantees that the impact area will remain
economically and racially mixed. Furthermore, an additional 1, 500
subsidized housing units are presently in various stages of development and will be available to any families who may be displaced.
Close to 800 market rate units are also being developed and will
help to absorb any demand in the impact area caused by Copley
Place. The City also has rent control and condominium conversion
ordinances which will help to mitigate the effect of market forces on
low- and moderate-income tenants .

'·

I

'·
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B.

The Jobs Policy

~-

The City has adopted strong affirmative action prov1s1ons for both construction
and . permanent jobs generated by Copley Place. The requirements for construction hiring include enforcement procedures which provide for final review by
an independent third party. To further ensure compliance with these requirements, the City will make referrals from its own training programs and from
those of neighborhood based organizations. A placement office will be established
.,
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on-site for the hiring of permanent employees and the developer 1.vill report
on a quarterly basis to the Mayor and City Council on the number of residents
working in the project.
VI.

Copley Place Will Further Equal Opportunity

As noted above, strong affirmative action requirements will ensure that lowand moderate-income individuals, especially members of minority groups, will
benefit from the economic activity generated by the project. There is, on the
other hand , no evidence to indicate that minorities will suffer disproportionately
from any poten tial jropacts of the project. Nevertheless, any minorities who
were to be displaced would have access to a wide range of housing options
.both existing stock and anticipated new developments - both within their
present neighborhoods and in the rest of Boston.

VII.

Environmental Plan.ning Is Proceeding Without Substantial Problems

The environmental review process for Copley Place is expected to be completed
Draft responses to 95% of the comments received on the
draft EIS/EIR have already been prepared and the final EIS/EIR is expected
to be submitted for review in September, with completion of the total process
in October of this year.

in a timely fashion.

The project is in compliance with all applicable energy conservation requirements
and there is no reason to believe that adequate energy will not be available.
The shadows cast by the project will have only a minimal effect on Copley
Square compared to those cost by existing development.
The traffic and parking impact studies carried out for the draft EIS/EIR
follow accepted principles and indicate only minimal impact, especially in view
of improved transit accessibility and the City's commitment to a resident
sticker parking program.
VIII.

·.

Conclusion

The City of Boston has prepared a detailed response to each point raised in
the Administrative Complaint. These responses have been based on HUD
regulations, the City's performance, and the facts of this situation. An
unbiased appraisal of the case would clearly recognize the validity of the
City's UDAG application for Copley Place. In the final analysis this position
rests on the basic premise of the UDAG program. Copley Place is a project
by which Federal funds will leverage substantial private invesbnent to the
direct and indirect benefit of low- and moderate-income people, especially
members of minority groups. Under these circumstance, HUD will best fulfill
its mandate by approving the City's application for UDAG funding. Copley
Place deserves HUD's support.
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COPLEY PLACE

DEVELOPER:

Urban Investment and Development Co. of Oiicago,
a subsidiary of Ae tna Life &Casualty .

SITE:

9.5 acre land and air rights in Boston's Back Bay
with direct access to and fr on the ~fassachusetts
Turnpike, the ~ IBTA's Orange Line (under construction) ,
AMTRAK and the Boston and ~!aine Railroad.

PROJECT CCMPrn-IE\ffS:

- - An 804-room Westin llL'<tny hotel.
- -A

1, 145 Ma rrfott convention -style hotel.

8~5,000

square feet of commercial office space.
A 385,000 square foot retail center -- which includes
100 ,000 square foot \leiman. -.'·!arcus specialty depart:'lent
store and a 53, 000 square foot Bonwit Teller -- \ 'ith
shops, restaurants, cinemas and community-oriented
retail space.
100 mixed-income residential units.
1,432 parking spaces.
PROJECT CCNPLETED:

1983-1984

CONSTRUCTION COST:

$400,000,000

FINA!~CING ARR~~GED

FI~A:' JCING

WESTI~

BY:

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York
The First National Bank of Oiicago
Citicorp Real Estate, Inc.

PARTICIPANTS: The First National Bank of Boston
Security Pacific National Bank
Seattle-First :Jational Bank
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development

HOTEL

ARGUTECT:

CONfRA.CTOR:

The Architects Collaborative Inc. , of Cambridge,
Turner Construction Company, of New York, NY

~lA..

RETAIL/OFFICE
ARGUTECT:
CONfRACTOR:

The Architects Collaborative Inc., of Cambridge, M..\.
Perini Corporation, of Framingham, ~1A

Urban Investment and Development Co., John Hancock Tower, 200 Cbrendon Street, Boston, MA 02116 (617) 536-8500 °- .. ·~ ~~ ·-

~··
FOR

COPLEY
PLACE

RELE~E :

COi\1TACT:

At Will
Teri F. Weidner

- - COPLEY PLACE - ~·illTI -MILLION

OOLLAR DE\'ELO?.•IENT FORETELLS

NEW LAi'filvlA.RK IN BOSTON

BOSTON -- Copley Place, at $400 million the largest mixed-use development
in Boston and one of the most ambitious currently undenv-ay nationwide, is well
on its way to becoming ·the newest landmark in this history-making city.
It was November 13, 1980, when Urban Investment and Development Co. of
Chicago, a subsidiary of Aetna Life

&Casualty,

broke ground for Copley Place,

cu111inating over four years of pre-construction project planning.

"In the

first year after groundbreaking, we have seen rapid construction progress, substantial leasing activity for both the office and retail space, the· closing of
project financing commitments, and completion of architectural and interior
design planning for each project component," said Kenneth A. Himmel, senior
vice president and project manager.

''Hundreds of construction workers hav:

been employed on the site, and their ntnnbers will expand to nearly 1,000 next
\

year."

(

TI-IE PROJECT COMPONENTS

When fully operational in 1984, Copley Place will include two major
hotels -- the 804-room deluxe Westin Hotel-Copley Place, Boston, and a 1145room convention-style Marriott Hotel.

A 385,000 square foot retail mall will

feature a two-level gallery of shops, a unique collection of restaurants, and
a nine-screen Sack cinema complex. Retail anchors will be the first

:;-rei.Man-~~rcus

- more -

~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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S'pecialty departmeut store in New E11gland and Bonwit Teller.

The

~roject

will also

include four office buildings with a total of 845,000 square feet of Class A office
s~ace
~11d

that surrounds a nine-story central Atriun, 100 mixed-income residential u.11its,

indoor

~arkL11g

for 1,432 cars.

Unlike any other major r etail cente r in Boston and
\dll offer

shop~ ~rs

~ew

England, Copley Place

an "inside street," two levels of shops and restaurants in an

interior landscaped setting that 1vill reflect the materials and textures of Boston's
historic Back Bay.

Like architect Frederick Law Olmsted's famed Emerald :'-Jecklace

concept for linking Boston proper with parks and thoroughfares, the Atrium space
in Copley Place will be landscaped with seasonal flowers, shrubs and trees, designed
to provide a year-round atmosphere encouraging walking and browsing.

A nrulti-story

water sculpture will provide the centerpiece of the Atrium.
FI~A1\JCI NG

Copley Place holds the distinction of being awarded tlS.8 million from the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the largest Urban Development
Action Grant (UDAG) ever.

The UDAG program was begun during the Carter administra-

tion to encourage investment of private capital in urban centers.

The City of

Boston will administer the Copley Place UDAG, $15.5 million of which is a loan,
the remainder a grant.

Interest from Urban's repayment of the loan portion to the

City over the next 27 years will be eannarked for Boston's Neighborhood Development
Loan Bank, creating a unique fund of $42 million for improvements to nearby neighborhoods.
More than $350 million in private financing for the complex will be provided

'\

via three separate loans.

Financing was arranged by Morgan Guaranty Tn1st Company

of New York, The First National Bank of Chicago and Citibank, N.A. of New York.
- more -
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These lead banks hill be joined by three others, Tne First National Bank of Boston,
Security Pacific National Bank, Los Angeles, and Seattle-First National Bank, in
providing financing.
SITE CCNPLEXI1Y

The development is being built on a 9.5 acre air rights site adjacent to
Boston's Cople, Square, an historic focal point of commercial and residential
activity.

The site, and air rights above it, are being leased to Urban from the

~ lassachusetts

Turnpike Authority which owns the property.

Cleared in the late 1950' s to make way for the

~lassachusetts

sion, the land today includes the major Boston interchange of the

Turnpike Ext en~!assachusetts

Turnpike, rail beds for .1.rntrak and Conrail, and the Orange line of Boston's rapid
transit service (presently undergoing relocation).

These activities will cont i nue

to occur llllinterrupted beneath the completed Copley Place comolex.
city thoroughfares also border the site.

Three rna ior

Comprehensive roadway redesign, relocation

of electric, gas, telephcne and water lines were necess ary to prepare the complex
site for construction.
PUBLIC

I~VOLVDIENT

A public design review process, unprecedented in Boston history, and possibly
nationwide, has involved hundreds of citi zens representing corrnnercial and residential
commtu1ities surrounding the site.

The State and Urban agreed at the project's out-

set to invite neighborhood associations, advocacy groups and several

goveTIL~ent

agencies to participate actively in the planning process to maximize conmrunity
benefits and enhance the pre-development revie1v of all project impacts on tte
neighborhoods.
- more -
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Over 150 presentations on Copley Place were made by the developer to illvolved
groups.

A unique Citizens Review Corrnnittee (CRC) was fanned to identify design,

envirorunental and other crnrrrnunity conceTilS, and· to develop guideline r ecommendations
for the project plans.

A reorganized group, knmvn as the Design Advisory Group

(DAG), still meets regularly to follow progress and architectural development of
the project.
PUBLIC BENEFITS
Copley Place has . already provided hundreds of construction jobs to Bostonians
. and area residents.
upon completion.
city.

Affinr~tive

Over 1,000 workers will have been employed ill construction

Copley Place will then mean 6,500 new, pennanent jobs for the
action agreements are the most comprehensive in tte country f or

private development, including goals for Boston residents and residents of neighborhoods adjoining the site .
Coverillg the Turnpike, the project will rej oill the Back Bay a.Ttd
South End neighborhoods that have been divided by
tracks for over a decade.

Turnpi~e

ramps and railroad

The stores, hotels, restaurants and offices located in-

side Copley Place will directly or indirectly provide an estimated $2 7 million
, annually in City and State taxes.

The Westin Hotel-Copley Place, Boston and the

Marriott Hotel will attract sought-after convention business and tourist income,
while Nejman-Marcus and other top scale retailers will create the most attractive
shopping environment in the city and metropolitan region.
EASILY ACCESSIBLE

LOC~TION

Copley Place will be easily accessible to motorists, pedestrians, and visitors
to Boston.

Logan International Airport, Government Center, the Financial District

and Downto\\111 Boston are only minutes away.

~1otorists

on the Turnpike can exit

- more Urban Investment anrl Development Co., John Hancock Tower, 200 Clarendon Street, Boston, MA 02116 (617) 536-8500 ......... ~~ ---
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directly at the Copley Square interchange . The Turnpike provides a direct link
with local primary arterial roads and the Interstate highway system.
Because all Turnp ike activity will be under a deck cover, the area wi ll be
re-opened to safe pedestrian access.

Copley Place lvill be linked to the Pruden -

tial C12nter .vi th a glass pedestrian -only bridge, and will join the Prudential
1

\-ii.th the J ohn Hancock office tower.

Additionally, the pro j ect will directly

link Copley Square with !'-Jeirr,an->1arcus, Saks Fifth Avenue and Lord & Taylor.
The new Back Bay Station, under construct ion across Dartmouth Street from
Copley Place, wi ll be utili zed by some 55,000 rail passengers daily.

The project

will also be access ible via :'-f assachusetts Bay Transit Authority buses and rapid
service trains.
LEASING
Retail leasing agent for the project is Strouse-Greenberg and Co. (617-5234080) and Ryan, El liot and Company, Inc. (617-53 7-8220) is exclusive agent for the

office component.
A.BOITT URBA\I

Urban Investment and Development Co., a subsidiary of Aetna Life
, is one of the nation's largest pr oducers of quality improved property.
close of 1981, Urban had more than $1 billion
states.

~n

&Casualty ,
At the

assets withoperations in lo

The company develops and owns office buildings, mix:ed-use structures,

shopping centers, planned corram.m.ities, luxury hotels, and other corrnnercial and
industrial properties.

The Chicago-based company has offices in Boston, Denver,

Hartford, Houston, Philadelphia and Seattle.
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Retail/
Office
Rentable
Area, s. f.

Copley Plar.e Program
Western International
Hotel
Luxury hotel. 781 rooms
747,260
Parking, 275 spaces
100,540
Marriott Hotel
Convention hotel, 1,008
rooms
804,31 0
Extensive meeting
facilities
Neiman-Marcus
96,090
96,090
Retail Mall Shops
250,420 250.420
Community Retail Shops
8,000
8,000
Cinemas
16,000
16,000
SeNice Level, Mall,
Circulation, SeNice
Corridors, Mechanical
150,120
Office
771 ,400 699,940
Housing
100 Units
85,000
Parking
Retail, Offi ce. and
Marriott Hotel
1.157 spaces
404,920
Total Area
3.434,060 1,070.450
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